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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. brings a Commerce Clause 
challenge to the Interstate Wagering Amendment, which amended 18 
U.S.C. § 1301 (1994) by prohibiting the transmission in 
interstate commerce of information to be used for the purpose of 
procuring a lottery ticket.  Because the Amendment regulates an 
activity affecting interstate commerce and rationally relates to 
the goals articulated by Congress, we hold the Amendment was a 
constitutional exercise of Congress' power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Congress has restricted interstate traffic in lottery 
tickets for over a century.  See generally United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993); see also Act of July 
12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90; Anti-Lottery Act of 1890, 
ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 1301, the current 
prohibition on interstate traffic in lottery tickets, was enacted 
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by Congress in 1895.  Before amendment by the Interstate Wagering 
Amendment, § 1301 provided: 
Whoever brings into the United States for the 
purpose of disposing of the same, or 
knowingly deposits with any express company 
or any common carrier for carriage, or 
carries in interstate or foreign commerce any 
paper, certificate, or instrument purporting 
to be or to represent a ticket, chance, 
share, or interest in or dependent upon the 
event of a lottery, gift enterprise, or 
similar scheme, offering prizes dependent in 
whole or part upon lot or chance, or any 
advertisement of, or list of prizes drawn or 
awarded by means of, any such lottery, gift 
enterprise, or similar scheme; or knowingly 
takes or receives any such paper, 
certificate, instrument, advertisement, or 
list so brought, deposited or transported, 
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
 
Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963; 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988). 
 Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation 
that was engaged in the business of taking orders for, and 
purchasing, out-of-state lottery tickets on behalf of customers. 
Pic-A-State's operations were designed to avoid the longstanding 
prohibition on the interstate traffic in lottery tickets by 
keeping the tickets themselves in the state of origin and 
transferring only a computer-generated "receipt" to the customer. 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania tried repeatedly to 
put a stop to Pic-A-State's operations.  In 1993, the 
Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 8 of 1993, which prohibited 
the sale of any interest in another state's lottery.  72 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. § 3761-9(c) (1995).  Pic-A-State challenged this 
legislation in federal court on dormant Commerce Clause grounds, 
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and the statute was struck down by the district court.  Pic-A-
State Pa. v. Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993). 
On appeal, we reversed citing an intervening change in federal 
law, the Interstate Wagering Amendment, which made the 
Pennsylvania statute fully consistent with federal law and not 
unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.  Pic-A-State Pa. v. 
Pennsylvania, 42 F.3d 175, 178-80 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Pic-A-State 
I"). 
   The Interstate Wagering Amendment amended 18 U.S.C. 
§1301 by providing that, in addition to § 1301's extant 
prohibition on the transfer in interstate commerce of any lottery 
ticket, any person who: 
being engaged in the business of procuring 
for a person in 1 State such a ticket, 
chance, share, or interest in a lottery, 
gift, enterprise or similar scheme conducted 
by another State (unless that business is 
permitted under an agreement between the 
States in question or appropriate authorities 
of those States), knowingly transmits in 
interstate or foreign commerce information to 
be used for the purpose of procuring such a 
chance, share or interest; . . . shall be 
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
more than two years, or both. 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, § 320905, 108 Stat. 2126, 2147 (emphasis added). 
This Amendment was explicitly intended to prohibit Pic-A-State's 
line of business. 
 Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania was the primary 
sponsor of the Interstate Wagering Amendment.  He explained that 
"current law prohibit[s] interstate transfer of lottery 
tickets . . . .  However, due to advances in communication 
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technologies, current law does not accomplish its intended 
goals."  139 Cong. Rec. S15247.  He also noted the district 
court's decision in Pic-A-State Pa. v. Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 
(M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993), allowed "the sale of interests in out-
of-state lottery tickets via computer transaction with no paper 
crossing state lines."  Id.  The Amendment was designed to close 
this "loophole."  Id. 
 Senator Specter identified two other purposes for the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment.  First, that the Amendment was 
necessary to preserve "the right of a State to regulate lottery 
[sic] and gambling within its borders."  Id.  He stated, "Federal 
laws should continue to limit the proliferation of interstate 
gambling to preserve the sovereignty of States that do not permit 
certain forms of gambling."  Id.  Second, that businesses such as 
Pic-A-State's would "undermine [the states'] ability to realize 
projected revenues."  Id.  Senator Joseph Biden echoed Senator 
Specter's concerns, noting the interstate sale of interests in 
lottery tickets "hurts the operation of lotteries in smaller 
States."  Id. 
 Three days after the Interstate Wagering Amendment was 
signed into law, Pic-A-State filed this suit seeking injunctive 
relief and a declaratory judgment that the Amendment was 
unconstitutional.  The district court dismissed Pic-A-State's 
complaint, finding no merit in any of its arguments.  Pic-A-State 
Pa. v. Reno, No. 94-1490 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995).  Since passage 
of the Amendment, Pic-A-State has terminated its business.   
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 We have jurisdiction to review the district court's 
final judgment dismissing the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
(1988).  "Our standard of review is plenary."  Juzwin v. Asbestos 
Corp., 900 F.2d 686, 689 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 
(1990). 
II.  RIPENESS, STANDING AND EQUITABLE RELIEF 
 As an initial matter, the Government disputes whether 
the district court had jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).  Article III, section 2 of the United 
States Constitution requires an actual "controversy" for a 
federal court to have jurisdiction.  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
The Government argues no justiciable controversy exists because 
Pic-A-State has never been threatened with prosecution under 
amended § 1301.  It asserts the controversy is not ripe, Pic-A-
State lacks standing, and Pic-A-State is not entitled to 
equitable relief.0  We will examine each of these contentions in 
turn. 
  A.  Ripeness 
 In Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), 
overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 
(1977), and Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983), the Supreme 
                     
0
  The concepts of standing and ripeness require related but 
distinct inquiries.  "The ripeness doctrine is often confused 
with the standing doctrine.  Whereas ripeness is concerned with 
when an action may be brought, standing focuses on who may bring 
a ripe action.  Although these doctrines are analytically 
distinct, both have evolved from Article III's case or 
controversy requirement."  Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 
F.2d 405, 411 n.13 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
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Court held that ripeness turns on "the fitness of the issue for 
judicial decision" and "the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration."  For declaratory judgments, we 
have refined this test because declaratory judgments are 
typically sought before a completed injury has occurred.  In 
determining whether to engage in pre-enforcement review of a 
statute in a declaratory judgment action, we look, among other 
factors, to (1) the adversity of the parties' interests, (2) the 
conclusiveness of the judgment, and (3) the utility of the 
judgment.  Freehold Cogeneration Assocs. v. Bd. Reg. Comm'rs, 44 
F.3d 1178, 1188 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 68 (1995); 
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 912 F.2d 643, 
647 (3d Cir. 1990).  After considering these factors, we believe 
this case presents a controversy ripe for resolution.  
1.  Adversity of Interest 
 "For there to be an actual controversy the defendant 
must be so situated that the parties have adverse legal 
interests."  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 648 (quoting 10A Charles 
Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 2757, at 582-83 (2d ed. 1983)).  Although Pic-A-State has not 
been prosecuted under the Interstate Wagering Amendment, the 
impact of the Amendment is sufficiently direct and immediate to 
create an adversity of interest between Pic-A-State and the 
Government.  Not only has Pic-A-State terminated its business and 
suffered economic loss in response to the passage of the 
Amendment, but any further attempt to pursue its line of business 
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would risk serious criminal penalties.0  "Where the legal issue 
presented is fit for judicial resolution, and where a regulation 
requires immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs' 
conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to 
noncompliance, access to the courts . . . under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or some 
other unusual circumstances."  Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
at 153.0 
                     
0
  At oral argument, the Government suggested that review of the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment was inappropriate because the 
federal government was unlikely to prosecute Pic-A-State.  Even 
if Pic-A-State were to resume its business, the Government 
asserted, any prosecution would be brought by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania under Act 8 of 1993.  Although a prosecution by 
state authorities would raise serious prudential concerns that 
might call for our abstention, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), we need not address this eventuality now.  Furthermore, 
whether Pennsylvania has threatened to prosecute Pic-A-State is 
irrelevant to a possible federal prosecution under the amended 18 
U.S.C. § 1301. 
 
 The Government's argument would also place Pic-A-State 
in an untenable position.  The district court found Act 8 to be 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause in Pic-A-State 
Pa. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 (M.D. Pa. July 
23, 1993).  We reversed because the intervening passage of the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment made Act 8 consistent with federal 
law.  Pic-A-State I, 42 F.3d 175, 178-80 (3d Cir. 1994).  If the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment is unconstitutional, our decision 
in Pic-A-State I is of doubtful vitality and prosecution of Pic-
A-State by Pennsylvania under Act 8 of 1993 would be suspect on 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds.  Thus, regardless of whether 
Pic-A-State is prosecuted by state or federal authorities, the 
central issue in this case is the constitutionality of the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment.  Yet the Government seeks to bar 
adjudication of this issue at this time. 
0
  Pic-A-State argues that under Babbitt v. United Farm Workers 
Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 
U.S. 452 (1974), "it is not necessary that petitioner first 
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to 
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his 
constitutional rights."  Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459.  While this 
statement is undoubtedly true, we note both Babbitt and Steffel 
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 Moreover, courts have found sufficient adversity 
between parties to create a justiciable controversy when suit is 
brought by the only plaintiff subject to regulation by an 
enactment.  See, e.g., Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 
206, 210 (7th Cir. 1982) ("as the Act has only one conceivable 
target . . . it is extremely unlikely that the state would 
overlook the violation," and the controversy is therefore ripe), 
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); Entertainment Concepts, III v. 
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).  In introducing the Interstate 
Wagering Amendment, its sponsors were motivated by the desire to 
halt the operations of Pic-A-State specifically.  See 139 Cong. 
Rec. S15247.  Its chief sponsor mentioned the district court's 
decision in Pic-A-State Pa. v. Pennsylvania, No. 93-0814 (M.D. 
Pa. July 23, 1993), and explained the Amendment would close the 
"loophole" in the statute that allowed Pic-A-State to run its 
business.  Id. 
 Under these circumstances, we believe the likelihood of 
prosecution under the Interstate Wagering Amendment is so strong 
that a justiciable issue is presented.0  We also note that the 
                                                                  
involved challenges to statutes that criminalized the exercise of 
First Amendment rights.  Pic-A-State's claim does not involve 
these rights, and so we do not rely on Babbitt or Steffel in 
finding adversity between the parties. 
0
  Moreover, as a policy matter, strong reasons counsel against 
requiring Pic-A-State to engage in illegal conduct before its 
challenge can be heard. 
 
Fear that courts may find the statute valid 
will deter many from risking violation; 
defense of criminal proceedings on 
constitutional grounds simply is not an 
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Government, although it has stated that a federal prosecution is 
unlikely, has not expressly disavowed an intent to prosecute. See 
Presbytery of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 
1454, 1463-68 (3d Cir. 1994)  (failure of state to disavow intent 
to prosecute sufficient to create adversity between the parties); 
Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 
192 (3d Cir. 1990) (no adversity where state gives "express 
assurance that there will be no enforcement"). 
2.  Conclusiveness 
 We next examine whether the issue raised here is "based 
on a `real and substantial controversy admitting of specific 
relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished 
from an opinion advising what the law would be on a hypothetical 
state of facts.'"  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 (quoting Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937)) (emphasis 
added). 
 Where the question presented is "predominantly legal," 
a factual record is not as important as in fact-sensitive 
inquiries.  Compare Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy 
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. at 201 (question 
                                                                  
adequate remedy.  In addition to this 
practical fact, more abstract principles 
suggest that a citizen should not be required 
to sacrifice his wish to conform to valid 
social prescriptions in order to test his 
belief of invalidity;  citizens should be 
allowed to prefer official adjudication to 
private disobedience. 
 
13A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 3532.5, at 183-84 (2d Ed. 1984). 
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of federal preemption is "predominantly legal" and need not await 
development of factual record); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
at 149 (declaratory judgment challenge to regulations presented 
purely legal issues fit for resolution even before prosecution 
instituted); with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294-95 (1981) ("actual factual setting" is 
"particularly important in cases raising allegations of an 
unconstitutional taking of private property.").  Because Pic-A-
State brings a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment, further development of the factual 
record by the prosecution of Pic-A-State would not inform our 
legal analysis.  Both parties have approached this case as one 
presenting the purely legal question of the scope of Congress' 
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.  The Government has 
made no attempt to justify the Interstate Wagering Amendment in 
factual terms.  Accordingly, we believe the legal issues 
presented may be conclusively resolved even before the 
prosecution of Pic-A-State. 
 3.  Utility 
 Finally, we focus on the utility of the present 
resolution of this dispute.  We consider "whether the parties' 
plans of action are likely to be affected by a declaratory 
judgment."  Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649 n.9.  Unlike our cases in 
which we have concluded that a judgment would not have a 
significant effect, see Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 
405, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1992); Step-Saver, 912 F.2d at 649-50, we 
believe resolution of this case will materially affect the 
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parties.  Pic-A-State has abandoned its line of business because 
of the passage of the Interstate Wagering Amendment.  Were the 
Amendment to be declared unconstitutional, Pic-A-State would 
promptly resume its activities.  Accordingly, we believe this 
case is ripe at this time.    
B.  Standing 
 The Government also attacks Pic-A-State's standing to 
bring this suit, asserting no harm is imminent because no 
prosecution is pending.  As the Supreme Court has stated, "there 
is no question in the present case that petitioners have 
sufficient standing as plaintiffs: the regulation is directed at 
them in particular; it requires them to make significant changes 
in their everyday business practices; if they fail to observe the 
. . . rule they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of 
strong sanctions."  Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. at 154. 
Accordingly, we find no merit in the Government's argument. 
C.  Equitable Relief 
 Finally the Government asserts equitable injunctive 
relief is unavailable because Pic-A-State is threatened with no 
immediate harm.  The Government relies on Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971), and the line of cases that holds federal courts 
should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions.  See, 
e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943); 
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941).  Here there is no state 
prosecution, a federal statute is at issue, and there are no 
grounds for federal courts to abstain from hearing the challenge. 
 Therefore, we will reach the merits.  
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III.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution 
provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian Tribes."  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  This 
power is "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are 
prescribed in the constitution."  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 
196 (1824).  Accordingly, "[t]he task of a court that is asked to 
determine whether a particular exercise of congressional power is 
valid under the Commerce Clause is relatively narrow."  Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., 452 U.S. at 276.  "The 
court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated 
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational 
basis for such a finding."  Id.  This established, the only 
remaining question for judicial inquiry is whether the means 
chosen by Congress are "reasonably adapted" to the asserted goals 
of the legislation.  Id.; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).  "The judicial task is at an 
end once the court determines that Congress acted rationally in 
adopting a particular regulatory scheme."  Hodel, 452 U.S. at 
276; see also United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 733 (3d 
Cir. 1993) ("We will uphold application of the law if there is a 
`rational basis' for the congressional determination that the 
regulated activity `affects interstate commerce,' and if the 
means chosen to regulate the activity are reasonable."), cert. 
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1052 (1994); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 
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1119, 1126 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It is well settled that Congress will 
have validly exercised its power to regulate interstate commerce 
if the activity being regulated affects commerce, and if there is 
a rational connection between the regulatory means selected and 
the asserted ends."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).  
A.  Affects Commerce 
 It is beyond dispute that state lotteries affect 
interstate commerce.  In the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 354 
(1903), the Supreme Court held that "lottery tickets are subjects 
of traffic and therefore are subjects of commerce, and the 
regulation of the carriage of such tickets from State to 
State . . . is a regulation of commerce among the several 
states."  Although Pic-A-State does not transport actual lottery 
tickets across state lines, but only sells interests in lottery 
tickets via computer, its activities may still be regulated by 
Congress.  The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
extends not only to "the exchange and transportation of 
commodities, or visible, tangible things, but the carriage of 
persons and the transmission by telegraph of ideas, wishes, 
orders, and intelligence."  Id. at 351-52.  Congress' power to 
regulate interstate commerce also reaches the transmission of 
information by computer for the purpose of purchasing lottery 
tickets.  Moreover, Pic-A-State itself notes that national 
lottery sales exceeded $30 billion in 1993.  Brief of the 
Appellants at 20 n.5.  A business of such enormous economic 
impact is a proper subject for congressional regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. 
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B.  Rational Basis 
1. 
 Accordingly, the task before us is to determine whether 
Congress acted rationally in adopting the regulatory scheme of 
which the Interstate Wagering Amendment is a part.  Hodel, 452 
U.S. at 276.  Pic-A-State asserts the Interstate Wagering 
Amendment cannot survive scrutiny under a "rational basis" review 
because it is not "reasonably adapted" to a legitimate end.  It 
makes three arguments. 
 First, Pic-A-State argues the historical rationale for 
federal regulation of lotteries was Congress' perception that 
lotteries were "evils" to be strictly contained, if not 
absolutely prohibited.  In the wake of the legalization of 
lotteries by over thirty states, Pic-A-State contends that 
regulation of lotteries as "evils" is no longer rational. Second, 
Pic-A-State asserts the protection of the states' ability to 
regulate gambling within their own borders is an impermissible 
purpose for federal lawmaking.  Third, it contends the Interstate 
Wagering Amendment will insulate state lotteries from 
competition, and this restraint on trade is irrational. 
 Pic-A-State misapprehends the nature of a "rational 
basis" review of legislation under the Commerce Clause.  We do 
not substitute our judgment for that of Congress.  "Where the 
legislative judgment is drawn in question," our inquiry "must be 
restricted to the issue of whether any state of facts either 
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for 
it."  United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 
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(1938).  The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), does not change the nature of this 
inquiry.  Lopez asks whether the activity at issue could 
rationally be understood to affect commerce.  The Court did not 
reach the question of whether the legislation itself was 
rationally related to its announced goal.0 
 In introducing the Interstate Wagering Amendment on the 
Senate floor, its proponents advanced several justifications, 
including the prevention of reductions in state lottery revenues, 
the preservation of "the sovereignty of State lottery programs," 
and the enforcement of the federal laws prohibiting interstate 
gambling.  See 139 Cong. Rec. S15247.  The Interstate Wagering 
Amendment is rationally related to achieving these goals.   
 First, Congress could rationally determine that the 
sale of interests in lottery tickets across state lines might 
cause revenue shortfalls in some lottery states, particularly 
smaller states.  The Chair of the Pennsylvania Council on Aging 
stated in a letter to Senator Specter that the sale of out-of-
state lottery tickets would "have a direct and negative impact on 
Pennsylvania lottery sales.0  The final result will be revenue 
                     
0
  The impetus behind striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
under the Commerce Clause in Lopez was a concern for federalism.  
See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).  The 
Interstate Wagering Amendment supplements and guarantees, not 
usurps, the states' power to regulate their own lotteries.  
Despite Pic-A-State's arguments, it therefore seems an unsuitable 
object for a Commerce Clause challenge under Lopez. 
0
  The Director of Public Relations and Special Events for the 
Pennsylvania Lottery testified that "800,000 to a million 
dollars" is an "extremely conservative" estimate of the losses 
suffered by the Pennsylvania lottery in 1991-92 due to the 
interstate sale of lottery tickets.  App. at 213a-215a. 
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losses for programs that assist very vulnerable older citizens of 
Pennsylvania."0  139 Cong. Rec. S15247.  The Governor of Delaware 
also submitted a letter complaining that such sales "have the 
potential to negatively affect state revenues from lottery ticket 
sales, especially for smaller states."  Id. at S15248.  As 
Senator Specter noted, "[a]ny erosion of revenues due to the sale 
of out-of-State lottery tickets is contrary to the purpose of 
State lottery programs."  Id. at S15247.  "State lottery programs 
are based on the premise that the revenues derived from the 
lottery go toward State programs for the betterment of that 
particular State."  Id.  Congress made a reasonable determination 
that the prohibition of interstate sales of lottery tickets would 
promote the purposes for which the various states have instituted 
lotteries.  We will not second-guess this judgment. 
 Moreover, Congress rationally believed that the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment served the purpose of preserving 
state sovereignty in the regulation of lotteries.  Senator 
Specter explained:   
 
the right of a State to regulate lottery 
[sic] and gambling within its borders must be 
preserved.  Federal gambling laws have 
traditionally enabled the States to regulate 
in-State gambling.  Federal laws should 
continue to limit the proliferation of 
interstate gambling to preserve the 
sovereignty of States that do not permit 
certain forms of gambling. 
                     
0
  Proceeds from the Pennsylvania lottery are earmarked for 
programs that benefit senior citizens.  See 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§3761-2 (1995). 
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Id.  The Interstate Wagering Amendment furthered these goals by 
giving the states the sole right to regulate lottery sales within 
their borders.  The states need not permit the sale of interests 
in out-of-state lottery tickets, but may do so by concluding an 
agreement for that purpose with other states.  18 U.S.C. § 1301. 
The Interstate Wagering Amendment thus allows the various states 
to gauge the economic effects of their own lotteries without out-
of-state interference, to form their own judgments about the 
propriety of lotteries, and to regulate the types of state-
sponsored gambling they wish to allow within their borders. 
 Finally, Congress could rationally conclude that the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment was necessary to effectuate the 
purposes for which 18 U.S.C. § 1301 was originally enacted.  As 
Senator Specter stated, the federal gambling laws were clearly 
intended to prohibit the interstate transportation and sale of 
lottery tickets, but "the development of communications 
technology resulted in [a] loophole in the Federal lottery law" 
that allowed such transactions to be consummated by computer with 
no papers crossing state lines.  139 Cong. Rec. S15247.  Both 
Pennsylvania Senators believed this loophole "plainly violat[ed] 
the spirit and intent of the Federal law" and introduced the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment in order to close it.  Id. at 
S15247-48. 
 In the context of the one-hundred year history of §1301 
and the federal regulation of lotteries, Congress could 
rationally conclude the need for an amendment to close a loophole 
created by advances in technology unforeseeable at the time the 
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statute was originally drafted.  Congress believed that since the 
sale of lottery tickets across state lines was illegal, the sale 
of interests in tickets across state lines by computer should be 
illegal as well.  We believe the Commerce Clause requires no more 
indication of rationality for us to uphold the statutory scheme 
adopted by Congress.0 
2. 
 Even evaluating the rationality of the Interstate 
Wagering Amendment on the terms suggested by Pic-A-State, we hold 
it was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to legislate 
under the Commerce Clause.  Pic-A-State argues that because 
lotteries have been legalized by the majority of states, the 
interstate sale of lottery tickets may no longer rationally be 
prohibited on moral grounds.  We disagree.  Although many states 
have legalized lotteries, some have not.  Congress could 
rationally decide to legislate in support of the policies of 
nonlottery states by placing the regulation of lotteries within 
the discretion of each state and prohibiting out-of-state 
interference.  See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. 
                     
0
  Pic-A-State notes Congress did not conduct factfinding or rely 
on empirical research in drafting the Interstate Wagering 
Amendment and argues that this undermines the Amendment's 
rationality.  We are unpersuaded, as several of the 
justifications advanced by Congress are rational on their face. 
Pic-A-State further argues Congress' conclusion that the 
Amendment would prevent revenue shortfalls in smaller states is 
mistaken as a factual matter.  Even were this so, we would uphold 
the Interstate Wagering Amendment under rational basis review. 
Rational basis review "is not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."  FCC v. Beach 
Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993)).  "Congress need 
not make particularized findings in order to legislate."  Perez 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971).   
21 
Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993) ("[T]he Government has a substantial 
interest in supporting the policy of nonlottery States, as well 
as not interfering with the policy of States that permit 
lotteries."); Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 357 (Congress may 
"supplement[ ] the action of those States . . . which, for the 
protection of the public morals, prohibit the drawing of 
lotteries, as well as the sale or circulation of lottery tickets, 
within their respective limits.").  Moreover, in arguing that the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment is irrational because lotteries are 
no longer morally proscribed, Pic-A-State necessarily implies 
that all of 18 U.S.C. § 1301, not just the Interstate Wagering 
Amendment, is now irrational.  As we have noted, § 1301 has been 
in the United States Code since 1895 and was upheld by the 
Supreme Court against a Commerce Clause challenge.  Lottery Case, 
188 U.S. 321 (1903).  We do not believe that circumstances have 
changed so substantially as to render this body of law 
unconstitutional. 
 As for Pic-A-State's argument that the Interstate 
Wagering Amendment is contrary to the spirit of the antitrust 
laws and therefore irrational, "neither the Sherman Act nor any 
other antitrust statute restricts the United States government in 
directing action in complete contradiction to antitrust policy." 
Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (citations omitted).  The 
interstate sale of lottery tickets affects commerce and is 
contrary to the policy of several states.  In these 
circumstances, Congress can rationally exercise its enumerated 
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powers to prohibit the passage in interstate commerce of lottery 
tickets or information relating to them. 
IV.  DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
 Pic-A-State also contends Congress did not have the 
power to enact the Interstate Wagering Amendment.  Under dormant 
Commerce Clause principles, states may not discriminate against 
the flow of out-of-state goods in commerce.  Pic-A-State asserts 
that Congress, in legislating to supplement the states' police 
powers, cannot give the states the power to discriminate against 
out-of-state goods because such discrimination is forbidden by 
the dormant Commerce Clause.   
 The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).  In Benjamin, South 
Carolina imposed a three percent tax on foreign insurance 
companies as a condition of their doing business in the State. No 
similar tax was imposed on South Carolina corporations.  By 
statute Congress had authorized state regulation and taxation of 
the business of insurance.  Id. at 412, 429-30.  Prudential 
challenged the discriminatory tax, contending Congress could not 
legislatively override the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition 
on discriminatory state legislation.  Rejecting Prudential's 
argument, the Supreme Court distinguished between the Commerce 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause: 
The one limitation bounds the power of 
Congress.  The other confines only the powers 
of the states.  And the two areas are not 
coextensive.  The distinction is not always 
clearly observed, for both questions may and 
indeed at times do arise in the same case and 
in close relationship.  But to blur them and 
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thereby equate the implied prohibition with 
the affirmative endowment is altogether 
fallacious.  There is no such equivalence. 
Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 423.  The Supreme Court concluded the 
Commerce Clause places no limitations on Congress' affirmative 
power to legislate, other than that the regulated activity must 
affect commerce.  Id.  It is now clear that Congress may consent 
to state regulation that discriminates against interstate 
commerce.  Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 
U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions 
which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional 
attack under the Commerce Clause."); Pic-A-State I, 42 F.3d 175, 
179 (3d Cir. 1994).  Congress had the authority to enact the 
Interstate Wagering Amendment in order to supplement state 
legislation, even though the Amendment enables states to 
discriminate against out-of-state lottery tickets. 
  V.  CONCLUSION 
 The Interstate Wagering Amendment regulates lotteries--
an activity affecting interstate commerce.  It rationally relates 
to Congress' goals of protecting state lottery revenues, 
preserving state sovereignty in the regulation of lotteries, and 
controlling interstate gambling.  The Amendment was a 
constitutional exercise of Congress' power to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause.  We will affirm. 
 
                         
 
 
 
